Individuals often invest actively and generate inferior returns. Social interactions might exacerbate this tendency, but the causal effect from peer effects on active trading are difficult to identify empirically. This paper exploits the exogenous assignment of students to classrooms in a large-scale financial education initiative to evaluate the transmission of trading strategies among individual investors. The paper shows that favorable peer returns on single-stock transactions stimulate market entry among inexperienced investors, even when total portfolio performance among peers is negative. The results are consistent with selective communication: individuals with trading background share their most favorable trades, which attracts others to the stock market. Inexperienced individuals who are exposed to peers with large returns on single trades appear to overestimate the value of active trading. The paper finds that these rookie investors make more stock transactions, trade more speculatively, but also generate inferior returns. The findings show the strength of social communication as a key determinant of financial decision making.
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INTRODUCTION
Well-informed financial decision-making is important for both the economic welfare of households and financial stability. In recent years, structural reforms to social security have shifted decision-making responsibilities away from the government and firms and toward private individuals. Among financial choices faced by households is whether to invest or not in the stock market. Lack of stock market participation might be costly, as the equity premium may be a key determinant of long-run returns to individual savings. However, for many households with little knowledge of stocks, the working of the stock market, and asset pricing, exposure to risky assets such as stocks might negatively impact their savings if they select costly investment strategies. For example, if they trade excessively, paying large trading costs, or if their strategies lack diversification generating poor returns on average.
What are, then, the determinants of stock market participation? How do individuals adopt new investment strategies and what influence their performance? The concentration of stock market participation in communities where other individuals are also likely to participate has triggered speculation that social interaction leads to powerful peer effects, increasing the interest in stock investments (Hong, et al., 2004; Brown, et al., 2008; Kaustia & Knupfer, 2012) . 3 However, many of these studies include large populations where the true effects on peer-to-peer interactions can be weakened. A second issue with prior findings on the determinants of stock market participation, and on peer effects in particular, is the failure to identify, beyond the participation decision, whether peer outcomes impact the trading strategies of others, and in turn performance.
Extensive evidence suggests that individuals often invest actively and generate inferior returns Barber, et al., 2009; Agudelo, et al., 2019) , and social interaction might exacerbate this tendency. Despite this concern, much of the previous research has focused on what induces stock market participation, rather than asking what determines the performance of an individual who enters the stock market.
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In this paper, we identify peer effects in stock market participation and examine how social interactions impact individual trading strategies. We exploit the exogenous assignment of students in a large-scale financial education program in Colombia. The program, run by the Colombian Stock Exchange (CSE) between 2008 to 2017, assigned registered individuals into sections that spend the duration of each course -between 8 to 14 hours over two weeks -studying about equity trading together. The nationwide initiative included over 1,100 courses in the 15 largest cities in the country. We analyze the influence of peer outcomes using comprehensive microdata that cover all the stock transactions of individuals during the sample period, identifying students with trading experience before the course, each of their individual trades, and the trading patterns of students that started to trade stocks after they finished their training.
We find that exposure to a higher share of peers with pre-course stock trading experience leads to higher rates of stock market participation after the course. An increase of one standard deviation in the share of peers with trading background (evaluated at the mean of all independent variables) increases the probability of other students entering the stock market by four percentage points, an increase of more than 25%. Consistent with the idea that peer outcomes also influence investment decisions, we find that the exposure to classmates with high recent trading performance positively affects the individual stock market entry decision. The effects are economically meaningful: A one standard deviation increase in the average returns a year before the course increases the probability of stock market participation of other students by 15%.
While our baseline finding that peer experience plays a significant role for market entry has been extensively documented in the literature, given the comprehensiveness of our transactions records and the fact that the time and location of social interactions in our setting are well-defined by each course, we extend previous findings by identifying two novel aspects of social transmission on investment choices. First, when we disaggregate performance at the stock level, we find that peer returns stimulate market entry among inexperienced investors, even in the cases in which average portfolio returns are negative, as long as experienced students have some large positive returns in at least one stock. In other words, peers with superior returns on single trades have significant impact on the financial decisions of their inexperienced classmates, even when their overall performance is poor. It seems that individual investors are willing to enter the market driven by the apparent 'winning' strategy of their peers. Our second crucial finding is that students who share a classroom with individuals who have recently experienced large returns tend to trade more actively and speculatively. Unfortunately, these novice investors earn lower trading profits (even before trading costs) than other students that did not interact with highly 'successful' peers.
Our results are consistent with the presence of social interactions and the transmission of investor sentiment. People cannot directly observe peer outcomes and rely on indirect cues, such as verbal accounts. Overall, our evidence is consistent with the idea that investors like to recount to others their investment victories more than their defeats, and that listeners do not fully discount for this; a behavior first termed self-enhancing transmission bias (SET) by Han & Hirshleifer (2018) . To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first study to clearly identify the bias in communication towards positive investment outcomes and to test the implications for market entry, active trading, and performance. In our setting, the mere presence of experienced peers and their biased reports about their best outcomes encourages other students to start trading. That is, peers with trading background and some high-performing stock transactions inject optimism into other students, motivating them to pursue of stock investments. Interestingly, active trading strategies -based on single successful outcomes -appear to spread from experienced towards unexperienced classmates, resulting in poor trading performance for new investors.
Our empirical strategy exploits two unique features of the data. The first is the identification of students with prior trading experience, which allows us to distinguish between students who exert an influence on trading strategies and those who are less likely to do so. Also, the transaction database allows us to identify trading performance at a granular level. That is, in addition to measuring a student's past trading performance, we can distinguish between successful and unsuccessful trades and examine the strategies that were adopted by new market entrants who shared the same classroom. The second is that courses were formed based on availability and not based on trading experience, resembling a random assignment. In other words, some students 5 without stock trading background are exposed to classmates with trading experience while others are not. Moreover, among experienced students, there is significant variation in trading history and performance.
Our analysis fills several gaps in the literature on the determinants of individual trading performance. First, excessive investor trading is commonly linked to poor trading performance and it is often explained by overconfidence (DeBondt & Thaler, 1995; .
Moreover, trading aggressiveness could be exacerbated by social interactions. For example, more than other investors, participants in investment clubs seem to select individual stocks based on reasons that are easily exchanged with others (Barber, et al., 2003) ; select small, high-beta, growth stocks; turn over their portfolios very frequently; and underperform the market . However, because of self-selection, these studies cannot directly identify whether peer effects are the key driver of the transmission of active trading strategies. For instance, if individuals choose where to work or the type of peers, it is difficult to separate selection from peer effects.
Our work contributes to this literature by empirically estimating the transmission of trading strategies and the implication for trading returns. While individuals self-select into CSE courses because of their interest in stock trading, they differ in their exposure to classmates with and without trading background. The courses, which on average are composed by 13 students without trading experienced and two with trading background, are small enough so that the influence of peer outcomes is likely to be strong and not diluted as in large settings.
Our work also contributes to the empirical literature on peer effects in investment decisions, some observational (Hong, et al., 2004; Hong, et al., 2005; Ivkovich & Weisbenner, 2007; Brown, et al., 2008; Li, 2015) some experimental (Duflo & Saez, 2003; Bursztyn, et al., 2014) . More recently, in a field experiment, Bursztyn, et al. (2014) separately identify the causal role of different channels of peer effects, differentiating between social learning -the inference that assets purchased by others are of higher quality-and social utility -deriving utility by the possession of an asset that is held by another individual. Overall, this literature has focused on product take-up, market participation, or entry. Our paper goes beyond the existing literature by 6 identifying how different trading strategies are transmitted across individuals. Understanding the dissemination of trading strategies among investors is more than academic interest: it can provide important, policy-relevant evidence on the sources of herding behavior in financial markets, and how potentially inefficient investments strategies are adopted by individuals. Our findings show the strength of social learning as a key determinant of financial decision-making, and that learning environments can sometimes produce unfavorable outcomes.
Other papers have used classroom environments to identify peer effects. Shue (2013) and Lerner and Malmendier (2013) use the random assignment of students into sections of the Harvard Master of Business Administration program to study how professional networks affect managerial decisions and how the interaction of students with successful and unsuccessful entrepreneurs affect new entrepreneurial activity. Using a similar strategy, we explicitly show that peer influence leads to more active trading and lower performance. It is possible that those drawn to the stock market by the accounts of apparently successful classmates are a priori unskilled individuals, whose participation in equity markets, and in particular in active strategies, is likely to result in disappointing returns. Our central finding is that active trading is particularly prone to be transmitted across individuals, since successful trades can easily catch the attention of others.
Diversification or passive strategies might not be too attractive stories to share with randomly assigned classmates, since by construction these strategies are unlikely to generate returns that significantly over-perform the market.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes financial education program and data. Section 3 presents the main results of the paper. Section 4 explores different channels of peer effects and alternative explanations for our results. Section 5 concludes.
DATA AND INSTITUTIONAL SETTING
This section describes the data and the construction of key variables. We begin by discussing the Stock Exchange education program. During the first few years of the program, the courses lasted two weeks for a total of 10 hours. The CSE strategy was to offer short courses, with students having to complete each level before being allowed to register to the next course. For instance, the progression would go from "Stock Trading Level 0," to "Level 1," and finally to "Level 2", with instruction that ranged from the basics of stock trading, to fundamental and technical analysis. A student would have to matriculate separately for each course, and depending on her interest, continue or not with the following level. Starting in 2013, the CSE opted for a new strategy whereby courses were of longer duration, with a more developed curriculum and modules for different topics. In this new system, a student matriculated to a single course of about 24 total hours that covers the entire program of stock trading. Importantly, since the inception of the education initiative, and independently of the course duration, students registered for a course would meet in the same classroom with the same instructor for the entire course. That is, the social interactions in our setting are well-defined by classmates and by the time of the course.
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A strategy to promote market participation was the "Stock Market Challenge," an online trading game in which participants showcase their trading skills during a two-month period, competing to generate the highest trading returns, to win a significant money prize.
DATA
Our analysis draws on three primary sets of data. First, we obtain data from the CSE on courses and participants. Each record includes detailed information on the beginning and ending date of the course, matriculated students and their national identification number, cost of tuition, total number of hours, location, and name and curriculum vitae of the instructor. Table 1 Classes had 16 students on average, with few classes with over 30 students, and some with as low as 10 students. One of the limitations of the data, is that the Stock Exchange did not collect demographic or socioeconomic information on their students. We classify students by gender using their first and middle name. We also determine the age range of each student at the time of each course using the national identification number. On average, female students represent 31% of the sample and 55% of all students were over 30 years old at the time of the course. Importantly for our analysis, the data include the national identification number for each individual, which can be used to merge the information with the financial education initiative.
Overall, 36% of the students in the CSE's education program had at least one stock trade throughout our sample period, either before or after taking the course. These 3,960 students with some trading history are more active in the stock market than the average Colombian individual investor. For example, while the average individual investor in Colombia owns 2.2 different stocks, makes 1.3 stock transactions per year, and averages 7,200 USD per trade, the students of the CSE education program who traded hold 6.2 stocks, make 6.6 trades per year, and average 8,781 USD of volume per trade.
Third, we collect additional information about students via an electronic survey. The survey had three parts: (i) Socioeconomic information, i.e., age, education, academic background, and earnings.
(ii) Experience in financial assets. For instance, whether the individual had any foreign investments or in mutual funds, which are not captured in the CSE trading tape. (iii) Selfreported social interaction. That is, whether they took the course with a friend or a relative and whether they talked to their classmates about investment strategies during the course. The survey was sent electronically on March 2018 to over 4,000 students with emails reported in the CSE data set.
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To encourage participation, students who completed the questionnaire before May 30, 2018,
were automatically registered for a lottery with a total payoff of 5,000,000 COP (around 1,600 USD). The response rate was 15.5% (775 students). According to the survey, 44% of the respondents had graduate education, 17% had some type of foreign portfolio investment, and many students (85%) reported to have discussed investment strategies with their classmates during the time of their course.
TRADING EXPERIENCE
The key variables of interest are the share of students in a class c who have stock trading experience ( ) and their trading performance. To be precise, we define experienced students as those with at least one stock purchase in a 12-month window prior to the beginning of the course.
The average share of experienced students in a class is around 14.8%, with significant variation across courses (Table 1 background, others have up to 60% of the registered students and, year-adjusted, a rate nearly seven times the rate of other courses in that year.
Returns were computed monthly using closing prices for each stock, considering all known open positions and transactions, i.e., buy-and-hold strategies and roundtrip trades. To be precise, for each experienced student, we compute the returns on each of her individual stock holdings, 6
and 12 months before the course, as well as her total portfolio returns during the same period. ). Overall, experienced students displayed positive average returns throughout the sample, although there is significant variation across courses -with average returns among experienced students ranging from -5% to 17%.
Finally, we define new market entrants as students without experience who made at least one stock purchase in the year following the course. 6 We have a total of 1,350 market entrants in our sample. These novice investors made on average 10 stock transactions in the year following the course, and although they displayed positive average returns, 3.1% per year, their marketadjusted returns were negative, -2.2%.
RANDOM ASSIGNMENT
As we are studying the peer effects on market entry it is important to elucidate on the obvious self-selection that may affect our results. Students of CSE courses are interested somehow in stocks and consequently end up taking a class, but among them, some unexperienced students are exposed to more experienced peers, with differences in trading background and performance.
Since courses were formed based on availability and not on trading experience or past returns, the setting resembles a random assignment. However, it is possible that as the courses were formed, a group of individuals with distinctive characteristics might end up matriculating at the same time.
For example, if the decision of individuals with trading background to register for a course 11 coincides with the choice of high-income men to sign up for these classes (characteristics known to correlate with market participation), market entry might be driven by the attributes of individuals rather than from their interaction with peers inside the classroom.
To deal with this concern, we test whether students without trading background in courses with more (above median) and with fewer (below median) pre-course trading experience display significant differences in any of their characteristics. We also run the same stratification test splitting the sample in courses where experienced students have above and below median returns.
The raw results of all 6 characteristics variables in our data set are presented in Table 2 . Only gender is significant, although the difference is small in magnitude -courses with below median experienced classmates have 3.3% more women than men. Other characteristics, such as age, students' earnings and education are similar for the two groups. Also, both groups of courses seem to have teachers with similar teacher experience (measured as the log of total hours taught by the instructor before the beginning of the course) and teacher trading returns (averaged over a year prior to the start of the course).
Another potential concern with our class setting is that friends or acquaintances might register together for a CSE course. For instance, if an unexperienced student matriculates in a course with a friend who has trading background, the interaction about trading strategies and past performance might occur outside the classroom, potentially, before the start of the course.
According to our electronic survey, while 22% percent of students reported to have registered for a stock trading class with a friend, among experienced students, only 5% stated to have taken the course with an acquaintance. In other words, most experienced students did not know their classmates before the start of the training.
EVALUATING PEER EFFECTS
Our empirical analysis proceeds in several steps. First, we examine the relationship between peer experience and market entry. Second, we evaluate the performance and strategies of new investors.
PEER EXPERIENCE AND MARKET PARTICIPATION
We begin the analysis of peer effects on market participation by plotting the average participation rate per classroom -number ( Figure 2A ) and share ( Figure 2B ) of unexperienced students -sorted by the share of students with trading background (above and below the median).
In the nine years of our sample, there are consistently more students entering the stock market from courses with a larger share of experienced classmates, both in absolute and relative terms.
That is, the participation rate is 20% (around 3 students per classroom) in courses with more experienced classmates, and 10% for courses where peers have less trading background.
If course sizes were constant, a higher number of experienced students would reduce the non-experienced students in the class, and the participation rate might mechanically be positively correlated with the share of experienced students. To deal with this concern and given the significant variation in course sizes, Table 3 examines the participation rate in courses with different shares of experienced students, conditioning on the number of unexperienced students in the class. In particular, when we compare courses with similar numbers of unexperienced students, the participation rate is significantly larger (up to eight times in some cases) if the course has more experienced students. Overall, our non-parametric analysis is consistent with the idea that there are substantial peer effects that might be driving the participation decision in the CSE courses.
We test whether the suggestive previous evidence holds up in a controlled regression framework. The empirical model attempts to capture social influence between experienced and unexperienced students taking the same course at the same time (sharing a classroom). We estimate the following model:
where the subscript c refers to a particular course and t the year in which it was taught; for a total of 875 courses. The dependent variable, , is the participation rate, or share of stock market entrants with no pre-course trading experience, and is the share of experienced students in each class. We control for the share of females in a classroom and the share of students older than 13 30. We also include course-level controls, such as the value of tuition and total instruction hours.
Common time-varying shocks might affect market entry. For example, high market returns are likely to be associated with increased visibility of stocks in the media, which could make some investors enter the market. We control for this possibility by including stock markets returns in different time-windows before each course (three, six, and twelve months), and for any other market-wide time-varying influences by including year fixed effects in the analysis ( ). Common time-invariant unobservables might also generate a positive relation between experienced peers and participation. For example, if residents in a city are financially more sophisticated, higher stock market investment might be common. We eliminate this type of influence from our analysis by including city fixed effects ( ). Finally, since different curricula in our courses (e.g., more advanced classes) might capture more interest in stock trading by individuals, we include program fixed effects ( ), that is, courses with identical curriculum.
Since the left-hand side variable in equation (1) is censored at zero, we use a Tobit specification. Columns (1) to (4) in Table 4 present the first main result and confirm the pattern found in the raw data: The coefficient on the share of classmates with a trading background is always significantly positive. The effect is not only statistically significant, but also economically meaningful. Using our lowest estimate in the fourth column, a one standard deviation increase in the pre-course trading rate translates into an increase of 28% in the predicted stock market participation rate after the class: the share of post unexperienced students that starts trading raises by 3.4 percentage points (0.21×0.16), from 12.0% to 15.4%.
In column (5) we explore with a related notion of trading experience. In addition to estimating the effect on market participation from having classmates with some trading background, we evaluate whether peers that trade more often further impact the market entry decision. We include in the regression the average number of trades from experienced students during the 12 months prior to the beginning of the course. According to our findings, peers with more active trading have a greater influence on students without prior market experience. These active investors are potentially more knowledgeable about stock trading or perhaps are generally more optimistic about the benefits of active trading, and thus appear to convey these ideas on their rookie classmates. We will return to the channels of peer interactions in the next section.
So far, the unit of analysis has been at the course level. We can also estimate the probability of market entry at the individual level for all unexperienced students. To be precise, for each unexperienced student, we define the dependent variable y as 1 if the student entered the market after the course, and zero otherwise. We estimate equation (1) adding individual level controls to the regression ( ). In particular, we include gender and age range of the individual, and whether the student took any previous trading courses; which potentially captures general interest in the stock market. Since unexperienced students in a class were exposed to the same experienced classmates, it is possible that their decision to participate is correlated. We correct for this by clustering errors at the class level. Our specification reads as follows:
Columns (6) to (8) in Table 3 present the results of estimating the probability of investment at the individual level using a Logit model. Once again, the share of classmates with trading background is positive and statistically significant. As expected, students that take multiple courses with the Stock Exchange are more likely to participate after the course. The crucial finding is that even when we control for course and individual characteristics, peer effects are still present.
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The magnitude of the marginal effects in the student-level model estimation are similar to those in the course-level regression: an increase in one standard deviation of the share of experienced students in a class, evaluated at the mean on all other variables, increases the probability of market entry by 4% over the average of 12% (a 33% increase). Similarly, not only peer experience -interacting with classmates with trading background -matters for market entry but having more active peers appears to enhance market participation.
The lower stock market participation among women has been widely documented in the literature and is often related to risk aversion and lower financial literacy (Haliassos & Bertaut, 1995; Rooij, et al., 2011; Almenberg & Dreber, 2015) .
PEER PERFORMANCE AND MARKET ENTRY
In this section we present the effects of peer returns on stock market entry. We experiment with the idea that the influence of peers on market entry should be more widespread when students with trading background have experienced favorable outcomes. Accordingly, we explore whether the average trading performance of experienced students in a class has any additional influence on market participation.
We estimate equation (2) including the average returns of experienced students in each course ( ). Column 1 of Table 5 reports the results. Our findings provide support for the view that peer outcomes influence the individual entry decision. More precisely, past peer returns enter the regression with a positive coefficient of 1.95. The effect appears to be economically significant as well. A one standard deviation increases in the average return of the experienced students, increases the likelihood of market entry by 1.2% basis points, which corresponds to a 10% increase in the probability that an inexperienced student starts trading stocks after the end of the course.
If individuals are more likely to share their success stories with others, it is possible that the influence of experienced students on their classmates varies between good and bad outcomes. We test whether selective communication is present in our classroom interaction in two ways. First, following Kaustia and Knupfer (2012) , we estimate a piecewise linear model in which we break down the peer returns into two variables that separately capture the slope estimates for positive and negative peer returns. The results show that the effect of past performance on entry rates comes exclusively from positive returns (Table 5, In our sample, there were 180 courses with negative average returns by experienced students. Interestingly, even in those classes, the average best performing stock among students with trading experience was positive (9.7%). In other words, while this group of experienced students had on average negative returns, some of these students had individual trades that were highly profitable.
To examine the idea that individuals share their best performance as opposed to their average returns, we calculate the average of the best performing stock among the experienced students in a class. We estimate equation (2) including this new variable and control for those courses where experienced students had negative returns on average. It appears that market entry is lower for courses in which peers had negative returns (Table 5 , column 5). However, when we include the best performing stock in the regression, the negative effect from past overall performance is indistinguishable from zero. Furthermore, the coefficient of the best performing trade is positive and statistically significant which suggests that the best trades from experienced students increase the likelihood of market entry by unexperienced peers, even when the overall performance is negative.
These results are consistent with selective communication. That is, individuals are more likely to discuss favorable investment experiences, even when their overall outcomes have been disappointing. Perhaps, appearing to be successful caries private benefits, and receivers of these biased signals are drawn to the market by the appearance of good peer performance.
TRADING STRATEGIES AND PERFORMANCE OF NEW INVESTORS
Above, we document peer effects in the market participation decision, and a strong bias for single positive trading outcomes to induce new investors into the stock market. In this section, we examine the performance of these novice investors who were motivated to trade by the apparent successful stories of their peers.
We first calculate the average trading returns of new investors (i.e., those that started trading within one-year of their first course) when they were exposed to various levels of peer performance. More precisely, we sort courses by quantiles of experienced students' returns and calculate the returns during the first 12 months of those unexperienced students that entered the stock market. Figure 3 presents the average trading returns of new market participants for different courses, and the upper and lower bounds of the confidence intervals at the 5% significant level. It appears that students exposed to highly successful peers display lower returns than students in courses where experienced classmates had lower returns: the returns of students in the top two quintiles of peer performance, are below the returns of students in the bottom two quintiles of peer outcomes.
It is possible that these results are driven by the timing in which new investors entered the stock market, or by individual characteristics, such as age, gender, or income. To confirm the nonparametric results, we estimate the average returns of new students (ret , ) as a function of observable course and individual characteristics as follows:
We create one dummy variable for each quintile of peer returns ( ). Other control variables are the same as in equation (2), and we calculate t-statistics from standard errors clustered at the course level. Figure 4 presents the estimated coefficients for each group of courses sorted by peer performance (i.e., quintile dummies) and their significance. The coefficients can be interpreted as follows: Students that entered the market and were exposed to the highest group of 18 peer performance display annual trading returns that are 7.08% below those in the courses where peers had the lowest returns.
It is possible that students exposed to experienced classmates with 'profitable' strategies, might be overly optimistic about the value of active trading, or perhaps they over estimate their own ability to select winning stocks and end up trading more actively. To explore these ideas, we estimate equation (3) but replace the dependent variable as follows: (i) the total number of trades of new market entrants, and (ii) the share of trading volume by individual investor that is used in speculative strategies. Speculative trades are defined as stock transactions that are reversed within a month, and the share is calculated over the total trading volume during a 12-month window after the end of the course. Figure 4 also displays the coefficients for the class dummies of each of these regressions. Students from courses in the highest group of peer's returns trade more actively, making on average 3.14 more trades per year, and appear to trade more speculatively, reversing 10.58% more of their transactions every month than students in the lowest quintile of peer returns.
To summarize, peer experience, especially positive trading history, induces market participation. Students exposed to classmates with pre-course trading experience with positively skewed returns are more likely to enter the market, trade more actively and speculatively, but also generate lower returns (even before including transaction costs).
CHANNELS OF PEER EFFECTS
It is possible that less-skilled individuals are precisely those that are persuaded to trade stocks from the biased experience of their peers. In turn, the negative returns of this group might result from a composition effect, that is, from the added presence of unskilled investors. However, the lower returns might result as individuals might be trying to mimic the best performing trades of their peers, buying and selling similar stocks as their 'successful' classmates. If these investors enter the market following large returns on single strategies of their peers, they might end up buying at high prices, and potentially experience lower returns. In this section we explore these and other related ideas.
TRADING STRATEGIES ON INDIVIDUAL STOCKS
In addition to the participation decision, there is extensive evidence that individuals living in the same region are likely to hold similar portfolios. For example, Ivkovic and Weisbenner (2005) show that individual investors are significantly more likely to buy stocks in a given industry if other investors who live within a 50-mile radius are also buying. Even professional asset managers who work near each other may end up investing like each other (Hong, et al., 2005) . In a survey, Shiller and Pound (1989) found that one in three individual investors said they recently bought a stock because a friend or someone else other than a financial professional talked with them about it. In our setting, it is likely that the biased communication between experienced and inexperienced students in a class promotes not only participation, but the interest in some particular stocks, which new investors might start trading.
To test this idea, we use the sample of students who entered the stock market after their trading course, and estimate the likelihood that the new investor i, buys a stock s as follows:
In equation (4), , is the share of experienced students in the course who traded stock s (at least one time) during the previous 12 months. We also include the trading returns of peers for each stock. We add the following stock controls, , : average weight of the stock in the domestic market index, COLCAP (a popular value-weighted market index), during the following year of the course, and the lagged six-month returns of the stock. To account for stock-invariant characteristics that may be affecting the likelihood of trading any given firm, we include stockfixed effects.
Panel A of Table 6 presents the results. Interestingly, we do not find any evidence that new investors trade similar stocks as their more experienced classmates. Moreover, there is no evidence that individual investors are purchasing the best performing stock of their peers. Conversely, these rookie traders appear to trade stocks with positive past performance, independently of whether their experienced classmates hold these in their portfolios. 
TESTING FOR MARKET INTEREST
Another interpretation for our results is that experienced investors do not affect other students directly but raise interest in stock trading and induce their classmates to take additional trading courses. To test this idea, we use the sample of trading courses which have a subsequent level, e.g., Stock trading level 0 and 1. In total, there are 368 of such courses; most of them offered before 2013. We repeat our strategy from equation (2), but instead of estimating the likelihood of entering the market, we estimate the probability than an inexperienced student matriculates for the following course. Our results indicate that skewed outcomes from peers, particularly, large positive returns, increase the likelihood of continuing with the training series (Table 6 -Panel B). Overall, the evidence from the CSE course suggests that peer outcomes, and especially the most favorable outcomes, generate an increased interest in the stock market.
TEACHER EFFECTS
While our evidence is consistent with selective communication inducing optimism in inexperienced investors, an alternative explanation is that instructors of these course might be sharing their own trading history, promoting more active trading among some students. During the nine years of our sample, 113 different instructors taught the stock trading courses. Among them, 33 made stock transactions on their individual brokerage accounts (we cannot observe the stock transactions of instructors who are trading for an institutional portfolio). These 33 instructors account for over 70% of all stock trading courses.
We test for teacher effects by including the instructor's teaching experience (number of hours teaching previous courses) as well as their trading experience. To be precise, we include in the participation model (equation 2) the instructors' prior trading performance. We found no evidence that the instructor's teaching or trading experience has any influence on the participation decision of inexperienced students. We also test for biased communication between the instructor and students, including the best performing stock of the teacher in a 6 and 12 months window before each course in the regressions. However, there was no evidence that teachers with good 21 outcomes encourage market participation among students. It appears that for inexperienced students, the accounts of favorable trades from their classmates generate more optimism and interest than the successful trades of their teachers, who are expected to be experts in the field of finance.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper tests how social interactions with peers affect an individual's decision to participate in the stock market and her investment strategy. We examine the decision to trade stocks among students in a financial education program in Colombia. This setting is empirically attractive due to the exogenous assignment of students to courses, and the ability to distinguish between peer outcomes and the adoption of new trading strategies. We find that a higher share of students with trading background in a given course increases market participation among students without trading experience. The effect is stronger when peers have experienced large returns. Importantly, average peer returns are not the key driver of market entry. Instead, single stock-trades with positively skewed returns appear to be transmitted from experienced into inexperienced students.
Our results are consistent with the idea that individual investors are more likely to share stories of their most successful trades, that is, large positive returns on individual trades appear to drive market entry among inexperienced students. However, these novice investors exposed to large peer outcomes end up making more stock transactions, trade more speculatively, and in turn generate lower returns. Successful stories from peers (or the appearance of success) inject optimism into individuals, who seem to overestimate the value of active trading.
Our analysis of peer effects in investment decisions is relevant to policy makers, finance scholars, and asset managers. The table shows mean and median of the share of new market participants, i.e., share of individuals without trading experience that started trading within one year after the end the course. Courses are sorted by quartiles of experienced students in the class and number of unexperienced students. This table shows the results of regressions on market participation. In the course-level regressions (columns 1-5), the dependent variable is the number of new investors entering the stock market 12 months after taking a course divided by the total number of unexperienced students in the "class. In the regressions at the individual level (columns 6-8), the dependent variable is set to one for new market participants and zero otherwise. Experience rate is defined as the number of students in a class with stock purchases 12 months before the beginning of the training divided by the total number of students. Trading activity is the log of the average number of trades of students with trading experience. The regressions include year, city, and course curriculum fixed effects. T-statistics in parenthesis. In the logit specifications (columns 6-8), t-statistics are calculating from clustering standard errors at the course level. * denotes significance at the 10% level; ** at 5%; and *** at 1%. This table estimates the probability of market entry. The dependent variable is set to one for new market participants and zero otherwise. The estimation is performed including average peer returns as an independent variable, and a piecewise linear model that employs a single change in the slope of peer returns at zero (columns 2-4). Columns 5 and 6 include a dummy variable equal to one for course with negative peer returns and the average of the best-positive stock trade among experienced students. Experience rate is defined as the number of students in a class with stock purchases 12 months before the beginning of the course divided by the total number of students. Trading activity is the log of the average number of trades of students with trading experience. The regressions include individual and course controls (gender, age, value of tuition), as well as year, city, and course curriculum fixed effects. T-statistics in parenthesis. In the logit specifications (columns 6-8), t-statistics are calculating from clustering standard errors at the course level. * denotes significance at the 10% level; ** at 5%; and *** at 1%. the probability that a new investor trades stock s. The experience rate per stock is the share of experienced students that traded stock s during 12-months before the course. Market index weight refers to the weight of the stock in the stock market index (COLCAP) at the beginning of the course. Returns are calculated for each stock separately. Panel B estimates the probability that an inexperience student matriculates for a course in the following level. All the regressions include individual and course controls (gender, age, value of tuition), as well as year, city, and course curriculum fixed effects. T-statistics in parenthesis. In the logit specifications (columns 6-8), t-statistics are calculating from clustering standard errors at the course level. * denotes significance at the 10% level; ** at 5%; and *** at 1%. 
Figure 4 Performance and strategies of new market participants
The figure plots quintile dummies estimate from three different regressions: (i) Returns of new investors, (ii) number of trades, and (iii) speculative trading. The regressions include individual and course controls (gender, age, value of tuition), as well as year, city, and course curriculum fixed effects. * denotes significance at the 10% level; ** at 5%; and *** at 1%. 
